American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics
ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)
Disclosure and Legal Advice
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 9,
no. 2, May 2017
(pp. 188–225)
Abstract
This paper examines how the advice that lawyers provide to their clients affects the disclosure of evidence and the outcome of adjudication, and how the adjudicator should allocate the burden of proof in light of these effects. Despite lawyers' expertise in assessing the evidence, their advice is found to have no effect on adjudication if the lawyers follow the strategies of disclosing all favorable evidence. A lawyer's advice can influence the outcome in his client's favor, either if (s)he can credibly advise his client to suppress some favorable evidence or if legal advice is costly. The effect is socially undesirable in the former case, but it is desirable in the latter case. Our results provide a general perspective for understanding the role of private information and expert advice in disclosure.Citation
Che, Yeon-Koo, and Sergei Severinov. 2017. "Disclosure and Legal Advice." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 9 (2): 188–225. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20140272Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C72 Noncooperative Games
- D71 Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D72 Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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