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  3. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
  4. August 2017
  5. Choice and Matching

American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics

ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)

Choice and Matching

  • Christopher P. Chambers
  • M. Bumin Yenmez
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 9, no. 3, August 2017
(pp. 126–47)
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Abstract

We study path-independent choice rules applied to a matching context. We use a classic representation of these choice rules to introduce a powerful technique for matching theory. Using this technique, we provide a deferred acceptance algorithm for many-to-many matching markets with contracts and study its properties. Next, we obtain a compelling comparative static result: if one agent's choice expands, the remaining agents on her side of the market are made worse off, while agents on the other side of the market are made better off. Finally, we establish several results related to path-independent choice rules.

Citation

Chambers, Christopher P., and M. Bumin Yenmez. 2017. "Choice and Matching." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 9 (3): 126–47. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20150236

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
  • D11 Consumer Economics: Theory
  • D71 Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
  • D86 Economics of Contract: Theory
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