American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics
ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)
Age-Dependent Payoffs and Assortative Matching by Age in a Market with Search
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 9,
no. 2, May 2017
(pp. 263–94)
Abstract
This paper considers a matching market with two-sided search and transferable utility where match payoffs depend on age at marriage (time until match) and search is finite. We define and prove existence of equilibrium, and provide sufficient conditions for positive assortative matching that build on restricting the slope and curvature of the marriage payoff function to generate single-peaked preferences in age and therefore convex matching sets. Payoff functions that are incompatible with positive sorting by age include all strictly increasing functions and constant flow payoffs enjoyed for some finite period.Citation
Sautmann, Anja. 2017. "Age-Dependent Payoffs and Assortative Matching by Age in a Market with Search." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 9 (2): 263–94. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20150237Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- J12 Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure; Domestic Abuse
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