American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics
ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)
Organizing Time Exchanges: Lessons from Matching Markets
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 13,
no. 1, February 2021
(pp. 338–73)
Abstract
This paper considers time exchanges via a common platform (e.g., markets for exchanging time units, positions at education institutions, and tuition waivers). There are several problems associated with such markets, e.g., imbalanced outcomes, coordination problems, and inefficiencies. We model time exchanges as matching markets and construct a non-manipulable mechanism that selects an individually rational and balanced allocation that maximizes exchanges among the participating agents (and those allocations are efficient). This mechanism works on a preference domain whereby agents classify the goods provided by other participating agents as either unacceptable or acceptable, and for goods classified as acceptable, agents have specific upper quotas representing their maximum needs.Citation
Andersson, Tommy, Ágnes Cseh, Lars Ehlers, and Albin Erlanson. 2021. "Organizing Time Exchanges: Lessons from Matching Markets." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 13 (1): 338–73. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180236Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D47 Market Design
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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