American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics
ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)
Strategic Evidence Disclosure in Networks and Equilibrium Discrimination
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
(pp. 192–227)
Abstract
A group of agents with ex ante independent and identically uncertain quality compete for a prize, awarded by a principal. Agents may possess evidence about the quality of those they share a social connection with (neighbors), and themselves. In one equilibrium, adversarial disclosure of evidence leads the principal to statistically discriminate between agents based on their number of neighbors (degree). We identify parameter values for which an agent's ex ante winning probability is monotone in degree. All equilibria that satisfy some robustness criteria lie between this adversarial disclosure equilibrium and a less informative one that features no snitching and no discrimination.Citation
Baumann, Leonie, and Rohan Dutta. 2026. "Strategic Evidence Disclosure in Networks and Equilibrium Discrimination." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 18 (2): 192–227. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20230285Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- D85 Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
- Z13 Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification