American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics
ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)
Ideologues Beat Idealists
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 4,
no. 2, May 2012
(pp. 27–49)
Abstract
Our model considers a majority election between two candidates—an ideologue committed to a fixed policy and an idealist who implements the ex post choice of the majority. Voters are aware that their individual rankings of policies may change after the election according to common or idiosyncratic shocks. We show that in equilibrium the ideologue often beats the idealist, even when this choice hurts all voters. Inefficiency arises both for sincere and for strategic voters; we also show that it is more pervasive in the latter case. Groups may be inflexible even when each individual has a preference for flexibility. (JEL C72, D72)Citation
Ghosh, Sambuddha, and Vinayak Tripathi. 2012. "Ideologues Beat Idealists." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 4 (2): 27–49. DOI: 10.1257/mic.4.2.27JEL Classification
- C72 Noncooperative Games
- D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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