This website uses cookies.

By clicking the "Accept" button or continuing to browse our site, you agree to first-party and session-only cookies being stored on your device to enhance site navigation and analyze site performance and traffic. For more information on our use of cookies, please see our Privacy Policy.

  1. Home
  2. Journals
  3. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
  4. February 2013
  5. Measuring the Efficiency of an FCC Spectrum Auction

American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics

ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)

Measuring the Efficiency of an FCC Spectrum Auction

  • Jeremy T. Fox
  • Patrick Bajari
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 5, no. 1, February 2013
(pp. 100–146)
Download Full Text PDF

Abstract

We propose a method to structurally estimate the deterministic component of bidder valuations in FCC spectrum auctions, and apply it to the 1995-1996 C block auction. We base estimation on a pairwise stability condition: two bidders cannot exchange two licenses in a way that increases the sum of their valuations. Pairwise stability holds in some theoretical models of simultaneous ascending auctions under intimidatory collusion and demand reduction. Pairwise stability results in a matching game approach to estimation. We find that a system of four large regional licenses would raise the allocative efficiency of the C block outcome by 48 percent. (JEL D44, D45, H82, L82)

Citation

Fox, Jeremy T., and Patrick Bajari. 2013. "Measuring the Efficiency of an FCC Spectrum Auction." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 5 (1): 100–146. DOI: 10.1257/mic.5.1.100

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • D44 Auctions
  • D45 Rationing; Licensing
  • H82 Governmental Property
  • L82 Entertainment; Media
There are no comments for this article.
Login to Comment