American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics
ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)
Local Institutions and the Dynamics of Community Sorting
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 6,
no. 3, August 2014
(pp. 136–56)
Abstract
This paper studies the dynamics by which populations with heterogeneous preferences for public good provision sort themselves into communities. I conduct laboratory experiments to consider which institutions best facilitate efficient self-organization when residents can move freely between locations. I find that institutions requiring all residents of a community to pay equal taxes enable subjects to sort into stable, homogeneous communities. Though sorted, residents often fail to attain the provision level best suited for them. When residents can vote for local tax policies with ballots, along with their feet, each community converges to the most efficient outcome for its population.Citation
Robbett, Andrea. 2014. "Local Institutions and the Dynamics of Community Sorting." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 6 (3): 136–56. DOI: 10.1257/mic.6.3.136Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C73 Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
- D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H21 Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- H41 Public Goods
- H71 State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
- H73 State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations: Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
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