Reference Pricing as a Deterrent to Entry: Evidence from the European Pharmaceutical Market
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AbstractExternal reference pricing (ERP), the practice of benchmarking domestic drug prices to foreign prices, generates an incentive for firms to withhold products from low-income countries. Using a novel moment inequality approach, we estimate a structural model to measure how ERP policies affect access to innovative drugs across Europe. We find that ERP increases entry delays in eight low-income European countries by up to one year per drug. The European Union could remove these delays without replacing ERP by compensating firms through lump-sum transfers at the cost of around €18 million per drug.
CitationMaini, Luca, and Fabio Pammolli. 2023. "Reference Pricing as a Deterrent to Entry: Evidence from the European Pharmaceutical Market." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 15 (2): 345-83. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210053
- L13 Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L51 Economics of Regulation
- L65 Chemicals; Plastics; Rubber; Drugs; Biotechnology
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