The Collateral Rule: An Empirical Analysis of the CDS Market
Abstract
We explore a novel dataset of daily cleared credit default swap (CDS) positions along with the posted margins to study how collateral vary with portfolio risks and market conditions.Contrary to many theoretical models, which assume collateral constraints to follow Value-at-Risk rules, we find strong evidence that collateral requirements are set an order of magnitude larger than what standard Value-at-Risk rules imply. The panel variation in collateralization rates of CDS portfolios (over time and across participants) is well explained by measures of extreme tail risks, related to the maximal potential loss of the portfolio. We develop a model of endogenous collateral in CDS markets to interpret these empirical findings. The model predicts that the conservativeness of collateral levels can be explained through disagreement of market participants about the extreme states of the world, in which CDSs pay off and counterparties default.