College Attrition and the Dynamics of Information Revelation
Abstract
This paper investigates the role played by informational frictions in college andthe workplace. We estimate a dynamic structural model of schooling and work decisions,
where individuals have imperfect information about their schooling ability and
labor market productivity. We take into account the heterogeneity in schooling investments
by distinguishing between two-and four-year colleges, graduate school, as well
as science and non-science majors for four-year colleges. Individuals may also choose
whether to work full-time, part-time, or not at all. A key feature of our approach is to
account for correlated learning through college grades and wages, whereby individuals
may leave or re-enter college as a result of the arrival of new information on their
ability and productivity. Our findings indicate that the elimination of informational
frictions would increase the college graduation rate by 9 percentage points, and would
increase the college wage premium by 32.7 percentage points through increased sorting
on ability.